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BY  O PE N IN G NEW  channels for communication and ser-vices in a society, cyberspace also offers new opportuni-ties for warfare. Indeed, it 
is more attractive than conventional 
military actions that require the ex-
pense and risk of transporting equip-
ment and deploying troops in enemy 
territory, not to mention the political 
risk. Cyberweapons could be used to 
attack anonymously at a distance while 
still causing much mayhem, on targets 
ranging from banks to media to mili-
tary organizations. 
Today, many nations have the ca-
pability to strike in cyberspace—but 
should they? International humani-
tarian laws, or the “laws of war,” have 
not been written with cyberspace in 
mind. So we face a large policy gap, 
which organizations internationally 
have tried to address in recent years, 
such as the U.S. National Research 
Council.8 
But there is also a gap in develop-
ing the ethics behind policies. Ethics 
is an important branch of philosophy 
with a tradition of more than 2,000 
years, and warfare has long been an 
important subject for ethics. Cyber-
warfare challenges many assumptions 
of the traditional analysis of the ethics 
of warfare, so it is useful to examine 
cyberwarfare from an ethical as well as 
a policy perspective. In this column, 
we describe some new and previously 
identified issues related to ethics that 
need attention.
Aggression
By the laws of war, there is historically 
only one “just cause” for war: a defense 
to aggression. But since aggression is 
usually understood to mean that hu-
man lives are directly in jeopardy, it 
becomes difficult to justify military re-
sponse to a cyberattack that does not 
cause kinetic or physical harm as in a 
conventional or Clausewitzian sense. 
Cyberattacks can be distinguished 
from cyberespionage by their deliber-
ate damage; some clever cyberattacks 
can be subtle and difficult to distin-
guish from routine breakdowns and 
malfunctions, but usually the effect is 
obvious because it is intended to have 
political impact. 
Does it count as aggression when 
malicious software has been installed 
on an adversary’s computer systems 
that we believe will be imminently trig-
gered? Or maybe the act of installing 
malicious software is an attack itself, 
much like installing a land mine? What 
about unsuccessful attempts to install 
malicious software? Do these activities 
count as war-triggering aggression—or 
mere crimes, which do not fall under 
the laws of war? Traditional military 
ethics would answer all these ques-
tions negatively, but they feature in de-
bates over the legitimacy of preemptive 
and preventative war.4 
Another important question to con-
sider: Insofar as most cyberattacks 
do not directly target lives, are they 
as serious? The organized vandalism 
of cyberattacks could be serious if it 
prevents a society from meeting basic 
human needs like providing food. A 
lesser but still serious case was the de-
nial-of-service cyberattacks on media-
infrastructure Web sites in the country 
of Georgia in 2008, which prevented 
the government from communicating 
with its citizens. 
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The laws of war mandate that noncom-
batants be avoided in attacks, since 
they do not pose a military threat.6 
Most theorists accept a double effect 
in which some noncombatants could 
be unintentionally harmed as “collat-
eral damage” in pursuing important 
military objectives,2 though some have 
more stringent requirements.13 Some 
challenge whether noncombatant im-
munity is really a preeminent value,1 
but the issue undoubtedly has taken 
center stage in just-war theory and 
therefore the laws of war.
It is unclear how discriminatory 
cyberwarfare can be: If victims use 
fixed Internet addresses for their key 
infrastructure systems, and these 
could be found by an adversary, then 
they could be targeted precisely—but 
victims are unlikely to be so coopera-
tive. Therefore, effective cyberattacks 
need to search for targets and spread 
the attack; yet, as with viruses, this 
risks involving noncombatants. The 
Stuxnet worm in 2010 was intended 
to target Iranian nuclear processing 
facilities, but spread far beyond its 
intended targets.10 Although its dam-
age was highly constrained, its quick 
broad infection through vulnerabili-
ties in the Microsoft Windows operat-
ing system was noticed and required 
upgrades to antivirus software world-
wide, incurring a cost to everyone. 
The worm also provided excellent 
ideas for new exploits that are already 
being used, another cost to everyone. 
Arguably, then, Stuxnet did incur 
some collateral damage. 
Cyberattackers could presumably 
appeal to the doctrine of double ef-
fect, arguing that effects on noncom-
batants would be foreseen but unin-
tended. This may not be plausible, 
given how precise computers can 
be when we want them to be. Alter-
natively, cyberattackers could argue 
that their attacks were not directly 
against noncombatants but against 
infrastructure. However, attacking a 
human body’s immune system as the 
AIDS virus does can be worse than 
causing bodily harm directly. Details 
matter; for instance, if it knocks out 
electricity and the refrigeration that 
is necessary for the protection of the 
food supply, a modest cyberattack 
could cause starvation.
A challenge to proportionality is 
that certain cyberattacks, like viruses, 
might spiral out of control regardless 
of the attackers’ intentions. While 
those consequences could be tolerat-
ed to prevent even worse consequenc-
es, lack of control means an attack 
might not be able to be called off after 
the victim surrenders, violating anoth-
er key law of war. Another issue is that 
the target of a cyberattack may have 
difficulty assessing how much dam-
age they have received. A single mal-
function in software can cause widely 
varied symptoms; thus victims may 
think they have been damaged more 
Proportionality
Proportionality in just-war theory 
is the idea that it would be wrong 
to cause more harm in defending 
against an attack than the harm of 
the attack in the first place; this idea 
comes from utilitarian ethics and is 
also linked to the notion of fairness in 
war. For example, a cyberattack that 
causes little harm should not be an-
swered by a conventional attack that 
kills hundreds.3,13 As one U.S. official 
described the nation’s cyberstrategy, 
“If you shut down our power grid, 
maybe we will put a missile down one 
of your smokestacks.”5
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than they really have, and counterat-
tack disproportionately. Therefore, 
counterattack—a key deterrent to un-
provoked attacks—is now fraught with 
ethical difficulties.
Attribution
Discrimination in just-war theory also 
requires that combatants be identifi-
able to clarify legitimate targets—the 
principle of attribution of attackers 
and defenders. Terrorism ignores 
this requirement and therefore elic-
its moral condemnation. A problem 
with cyberwarfare is that it is very easy 
to mask the identities of combatants4 
Then counterattack risks hurting in-
nocent victims. For example, the lack 
of attribution of Stuxnet raises ethi-
cal concerns because it removed the 
ability of Iran to counterattack, en-
couraging Iran toward ever more ex-
treme behavior.
Attribution is an issue not only of 
moral responsibility but also of crimi-
nal (or civil) liability: we need to know 
who to blame and, conversely, who 
can be absolved of blame. To make at-
tribution work, we need international 
agreements. We first could agree that 
cyberattacks should carry a digital sig-
nature of the attacking organization. 
Signatures are easy to compute, and 
their presence can be concealed with 
the techniques of steganography, 
so there are no particular technical 
obstacles to using them. Countries 
could also agree to use networking 
protocols, such as IPv6, that make 
attribution easier, and they could co-
operate better on international net-
work monitoring to trace sources of 
attacks. Economic incentives such 
as the threat of trade sanctions can 
make such agreements desirable.
Treacherous Deceit
Perfidy, or deception that abuses the 
necessary trust for the fair conduct of 
warfare, is prohibited by both Hague 
and Geneva Conventions. For instance, 
soldiers are not permitted to imperson-
ate Red Cross workers and adversary 
soldiers. However, some ruses, mis-
information, false operations, cam-
ouflage, and ambush of combatants 
are permissible. Cyberattacks almost 
inevitably involve an element of decep-
tion to make operations of a computer 
or network appear to be normal when 
have ceased by the attacker could even 
become part of the laws of war. How-
ever, reversibility is not guaranteed 
when it is unclear what is damaged or 
so much is damaged that restoration 
takes an unacceptable amount of time. 
We need to establish ethical norms for 
reversibility and make them design re-
quirements for cyberattack methods.
Conclusion
The issues we have outlined in this 
column are only some of the basic 
ethical questions we must resolve if 
national cyberpolicies are to be sup-
ported by consistent and effective 
principles. And the right time to in-
vestigate them is prior to the use of 
cyberweapons, not during an emo-
tional and desperate conflict or only 
after international outcry. By building 
ethics into the design and use of cy-
berweapons, we can help ensure war 
is not more cruel than it already is. 
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they are not, as with tricking a user to 
click on a malicious link. So, to what 
extent could cyberattacks count as 
perfidy and therefore be all illegal giv-
en international humanitarian law?9 
The moral impermissibility of per-
fidy is tied to the concept of treachery, 
and a prototypical example of a treach-
erous (and illegal) act in war is to kill 
with poison. Yet there are poisons that 
can kill quickly and painlessly, much 
more humanly than a bullet. This ap-
parent paradox suggests the concept 
of treachery (and therefore perfidy) is 
fuzzy and difficult to apply. We do not 
get as angry when software betrays us 
as when people betray us. But maybe 
we should—software would be better if 
users were less complacent. 
A Lasting Peace
In just-war theory, recent attention has 
focused on the cessation of hostilities 
and establishment of a lasting peace 
due to issues in recent insurgencies.7 
The consensus is that combatants have 
obligations after the conflict is over. 
For example, an attacking force might 
be obligated to provide police forces 
until the attacked state can stabilize, or 
attackers might have duties to rebuild 
the damage done by their weaponry. 
This suggests that cyberattacks 
could be morally superior to tradi-
tional attacks insofar as they could be 
engineered to be reversible.9,11,12 When 
damage done is to data or programs, 
the originals may be restorable exactly 
from backup copies, something that 
has no analogy with guns and bombs. 
Clever attacks could even use encryp-
tion to make reversal a decryption. 
Such restoration could be done quickly 
if the attack was narrowly targeted, and 
could be done remotely, so mandating 
reversal of cyberattacks after hostilities 
Insofar as most 
cyberattacks do not 
directly target lives, 
are they as serious?
